Is the risk of nuclear escalation rising between Russia and the west? | Rajan Menon

Warnings of nuclear escalation in Ukraine are now being issued with increasing frequency and urgency, due to dramatic policy shifts by some of Kiev’s main Western backers.

Some European countries, incl Great Britain, Franceon United States and Germany, reversed course, giving Ukraine the green light to use its weapons against sites in Russia. The latter two limited their authorization to Ukrainian strikes aimed at the defense of the Kharkiv region – although according to a report, Joe Biden may even remove this geographic restriction as well. The moves are a response to Russia’s devastating strikes against Ukraine, many from points beyond its reach.

These changes in Western policy—plus French President Emmanuel Macron’s plans to send French troops to a train Ukrainian forces in place and even possibly to fight – have heightened concerns that Russia could mount a nuclear escalation in response. Since then, Vladimir Putin has hinted at this possibility the day he invaded Ukraine as it is other senior Russian officialsmostly Dmitry Medvedevthe deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, who previously served as prime minister and president, and perhaps holds the record among Russian officials for frequency of nuclear threats.

The problem facing leaders and experts is that the risks of escalation are fiendishly hard to pin down. It is impossible to make predictions about nuclear escalation the way forecasters predict rain or tornadoes. Simply put, there is no reliable procedure for making assessments, no solid evidence to base them on, because there has never been a crisis in a multi-nuclear world that spiraled and culminated in the use of nuclear weapons.

Therefore, analysts and commentators trying to determine the risk of Russian escalation put themselves in Putin’s shoes and try to see the world and the war in Ukraine more closely as they imagine he does. Yet they cannot be sure that their attempts to reconstruct Putin’s views—based on the state of the battlefield and changes occurring there, including changes in the policies of Ukraine’s Western backers—correspond with his perceptions.

Even if this problem can somehow be overcome, there is another. Putin’s views are not set in stone—no leader’s are—and can change quickly based on his reassessments of how the war is going and what he needs to do to achieve victory. Outsiders’ conclusions about escalation have no solid evidentiary basis beyond what Putin and his aides say on the subject. Yes, analyzing the latest iteration (2020) of Russia’s nuclear doctrine may help, but there is nothing stopping Russian leaders from deviating from the script. In addition, this document sets conditions, such as a nuclear attack on Russia or a threat to its existence, that are not relevant to the war in Ukraine.

Moreover, there is no sure way to ascertain the value of statements coming from Moscow’s inner circle. Are they reliable guides to the Kremlin’s true beliefs, and therefore useful for predicting what Putin might actually do? Or are they part of an information war designed to unsettle the West and influence its policies governing what Ukraine can do with NATO-supplied weapons?

Because we can’t know what Putin and his foreign policy and national security team are discussing behind closed doors, there’s no way to know whether their public statements are warnings to be taken seriously or scare tactics to be ignored . The result? Some experts attributed the rise in Russian threats of nuclear escalation to posturing and attempts at intimidation, others see it as alarming.

In thinking about the problem of escalation, it is useful to imagine how and where Putin might decide to use nuclear weapons. Certainly he would not rain them down upon the United States or Europe; that would be suicide. Maybe he would attack Ukraine – but he would have to find a place that wasn’t swarming with Russian troops so they wouldn’t get killed too, and in large numbers. He may choose western Ukraine, far from the front lines, but launching a nuclear strike there for demonstrative effect could still kill many people, shock the world community and even provoke NATO retaliation.

Moreover, Putin’s messages to the Global South and sympathetic Westerners regarding the war in Ukraine have painted the West as indifferent to legitimate Russian security concerns, particularly Kiev’s NATO membership aspirations and its growing military ties to the West. Using nuclear weapons would be a bad way to win friends and influence people.

More importantly, despite “friendship has no boundaries” between Beijing and Moscow, President Xi Jinping has made it clear that he opposes the use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

While it is reasonable to worry about escalation and avoid steps that increase risk based on the (unattainable) certainty that Moscow’s threats are just noise, it is also important to understand that the risks of escalation go both ways. Putin is not immune from them.

After all, there is no escaping the fog of war. In such circumstances, it is essential to keep in mind the downsides of error—which, when nuclear weapons are involved, are catastrophic—but not succumb to paralyzing fear. Alas, this balance, while easy to prescribe, is difficult to achieve.

• Rajan Menon is Director of the Grand Strategy Program at Defense Priorities, Professor Emeritus of International Affairs at the City College of New York, and Senior Fellow at Columbia University’s Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies